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COMMENT
THE PROSECUTION OF SOPHISTICATED
URBAN STREET GANGS: A PROPER
APPLICATION OF RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)1 has
been called everything from "The Monster That Ate Jurisprudence" 2 to
"The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery." 3 Since the statute's enact-
ment, a plethora of scholarly articles has been written discussing the ramifi-
cations of "criminal" RICO,4 that portion of the statute dealing with the
federal prosecution and eradication of organized crime.5 While some schol-
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2. Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1990) (discussing a luncheon address about RICO
given by Judge David B. Sentelle of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia).
3. Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L.
REVIEW 165 (1980) (providing a detailed analysis of RICO prosecutions); see also G. Robert
Blakey & Brian Gettings, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO):
Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 1009, 1011-12 (1980) (attribut-
ing the origin of the phrase to Judge Learned Hand's description of the conspiracy charge).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1963 are known as the "criminal" RICO provisions, providing
criminal penalties for persons found to be engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.
Although "civil" RICO actions are essential to the overall goal of eradicating organized crime,
a detailed analysis of such actions is beyond the scope of this Comment. Generally, however,
"civil" RICO actions may be instigated by either the government or private citizens to seize
assets of criminal organizations or to obtain treble damages for victims of racketeering activi-
ties, either before or during a "criminal" RICO trial. See G. Robert Blakey et al., What's
Next?: The Future of RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1990). For general discus-
sions and criticisms of the civil and criminal portions of RICO, see Blakey & Gettings, supra
note 3, at 1012 n.13; Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393
(1992); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661 (1987) [hereinafter Lynch I & I]; Gerald E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a
Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 920-55 (1987) [hereinafter Lynch III &
IV]; Charles N. Whitaker, Note, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Bribery: Inappropriate
Tools and the Need for a Structured Approach, 78 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 2, at 1035; Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Poli-
cies of the Department of Justice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651, 651-55 (1990); John Dombrink &
James W. Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution: The Use and Abuse of RICO, 16 RUTGERS L.J.
633, 638-39 (1985); Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual Practical, and Political Guide to RICO
Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 769, 776-77, 786-92 (1990); Lynch III & IV, supra note 4, at 920,
978; Tarlow, supra note 3, at 165.
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ars, lawmakers, and policy experts have criticized and even grown to loathe
the statute as much as the career criminals it is designed to prosecute,6
RICO has emerged as law enforcement's most effective tool for combatting
organized criminal activity.
7
When Congress enacted RICO in 1970, it did so with the intention of
dismantling the Mafia.8 In the early 1950s, Congress began investigating the
Mafia and found that the organization it knew little about exerted a tremen-
dous criminal influence on the economy and structure of the nation.9 For
decades thereafter, Congress continued its investigation and attempted to
formulate a strategy for dissolving this powerful organization. 0 Through
the adoption of RICO, the government obtained a means by which to dilute
the Mafia's power by crippling its financial base. " As a result, RICO prose-
cutions have eroded the infrastructure of Mafia families throughout the na-
tion and lessened the effectiveness of the organization as a whole.
12
6. Dennis, supra note 5, at 652; see also Coffey, supra note 2, at 1037 (referring to Judge
Sentelle's equating the creators of RICO with the creator of Frankenstein); Terrance C. Reed,
The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 692 & n.5 (1990) (noting the
unsettling effect of RICO's increasingly broad application on jurists, lawyers, and laypersons).
7. Dennis, supra note 5, at 652; see also Ethan B. Gerber, Note, "A RICO You Can't
Refuse". New York's Organized Crime Control Act, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 981 (1988) (refer-
ring to RICO as a "powerful armament" in prosecuting organized crime families); Rod Nord-
land, The 'Velcro Don': Wiseguys Finish Last, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 1992, at 34 (stating that
due to successful RICO prosecutions, one of New York's five Mafia families is severely crip-
pled; the leaders of the other four families are in jail or awaiting trial; and none of the nation's
twenty-four Mafia families have escaped prosecution in recent years).
8. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36-43 (1969) [hereinafter JUDICIARY COM-
MiTrEE REPORT].
9. See S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
10. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 2, 16-24 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT]. The Kefauver Committee drafted several bills aimed at eradicating organized
crime. See, e.g., S. 2061, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (decreasing the government's burden of
proof in perjury cases); S. 1624, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (expanding the scope of current
lottery laws to encompass other gambling establishments and prohibiting bets or wagers to be
made through interstate commerce). Of the more than twenty pieces of legislation drafted by
the Kefauver Committee and introduced to Congress, only one was enacted into law. See
Boggs Act, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767 (1951) (providing for mandatory minimum
sentences in drug cases), repealed by Act of Oct. 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1 101(a)(2), 84
Stat. 1291 (1970). Prior to the enactment of RICO, Congress made other attempts to pass
legislation that would aid in combatting organized crime. See Consumer Credit Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title II, § 202(a), 82 Stat. 159 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96
(1988)) (creating federal jurisdiction over several crimes typically engaged in by organized
crime such as loansharking); Travel Act, Pub. L. No. 87-228, § l(a), 75 Stat. 498 (1961) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (criminalizing the use of inter-
state or foreign commerce to facilitate the commission of unlawful activity).
11. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (State-
ment of Findings and Purpose).
12. See supra note 7.
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As the turn of the century approaches and fear of the Mafia diminishes
along with the organization's loss of power, a new breed of criminal organi-
zation is moving swiftly to fill the void left in the illegal marketplace"3-the
sophisticated urban street gang. Born on the streets of large cities as frater-
nal organizations, many of these groups have matured into calculating and
efficient criminal enterprises, wielding considerable power."' In response to
this new and emerging criminal threat and based on similarities with the
Mafia, several jurisdictions have begun to use the RICO statute to prosecute
street gangs.'" Although prosecutors have met with a large degree of suc-
cess, criticism and controversy surround the RICO statute itself, particularly
with regard to its application to sophisticated urban street gangs.
16
At a time when many in the legal community are moving to radically
overhaul or abolish the RICO statute because of its perceived overuse, 17 at-
tempts to expand the scope of the statute must be carefully scrutinized.
13. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 34 (1986) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT].
14. See generally CARL S. TAYLOR, DANGEROUS SOCIETY 4-8 (1990) (detailing the struc-
ture, organization, and operations of Detroit street gangs).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming RICO
conviction of members of the Westies gang), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1486 (1992); United States
v. Williams-Davis, No. 91-0559 (GHR), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19465, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
1991) (prosecuting members of a Washington, D.C. street gang known as the "R Street Organ-
ization"), modified, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1176 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1992); United States v.
Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss charges against Chi-
cago's El Rukn gang on the ground that RICO was unconstitutionally vague); United States v.
Featherstone, No. 86 Cr. 861 (RWS), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14732, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21,
1988) (sentencing a member of the Westies gang after conviction on RICO charges).
16. The central question involved in applying RICO to gang prosecutions is whether
street gangs are organized criminal entities. See Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for
Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739, 747-51 (1990) (discussing street gangs and
finding that they are not organized criminal entities). There continues to be judicial opposition
to expanding the scope of criminal RICO beyond organized crime. See United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 311 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress
intended RICO to apply to organized crime and that the courts should apply the statute ac-
cordingly), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th
Cir. 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting) (adopting the dissenting opinion of Judge van Graafeiland in
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980);
Altese, 542 F.2d at 107 (van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for expanding
the scope of RICO beyond the intent of Congress by applying the statute to "every criminal
venture affecting interstate commerce"), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
17. Both judges and defense attorneys are critical of attempts to expand RICO's scope.
See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that
broad interpretation would bring minor offenses within the scope of RICO and thereby en-
croach on state autonomy), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d
564, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting) (asserting that the government erroneously
expanded the scope of RICO), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); Tamar Lewin, Epic RICO
Trial Over-Or Is It?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 15, 1980, at 6 (reporting a defense attorney's criticisms
of the scope of a RICO prosecution).
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Over the past decade, the RICO statute has been used to prosecute a profu-
sion of non-gang-related criminal activity that is beyond the design and
intent of the statute 8 and has evoked accusations of prosecutorial
overzealousness and abuse.19 Any new application of the statute must be
viewed within this setting and accordingly must conform to the intended use
of the statute.
This Comment focuses on the emerging use of RICO for prosecuting
criminal activity within sophisticated urban street gangs by analogy to
RICO's intended and successful use as a means to eradicate the Mafia. It
examines the Mafia, exploring the structure, code of conduct, and business
interests of the organization. This Comment then studies the federal re-
sponse to organized crime, focusing on the Mafia and tracing the design and
intent of the RICO statute and Department of Justice guidelines for prosecu-
tion. Next, this Comment analyzes landmark Mafia cases that clarify the
application of pertinent RICO provisions. Based upon this analysis, this
Comment reviews the characteristics of sophisticated urban street gangs,
emphasizing their structure, activity, and prevalence. This Comment then
analyzes several recent urban street gang prosecutions under federal RICO
provisions based on the design and intent of the statute, the established or-
ganized crime framework, and similarities between these gangs and the Ma-
fia. This Comment concludes that using the RICO statute to prosecute
sophisticated urban street gangs is not only proper and effective, but is also
necessary in order to realize the goal of eradicating today's organized crime.
I. ORGANIZED CRIME THE OLD-FASHIONED WAY: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE MAFIA AND ATTEMPTS TO ERADICATE
ORGANIZED CRIME
The Mafia could not exist without power and control.2° The Mafia ob-
tains power through its enormous financial base, and through this power it
18. See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 763-64, 768-69 (9th
Cir. 1980) (involving confidential bidding information obtained through bribing a public util-
ity); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing the conviction of
employees of a bail bond agency charged with bribing court employees in return for referrals
and stating that RICO was not intended to punish violations of state law); United States v.
Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197, 198 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (discussing the indictment charging a RICO
violation where an employee of General Motors was found to be collecting usurious debts from
other employees on company premises).
19. See Dombrink & Meeker, supra note 5, at 640-42; Rene Augustine, Introduction to
Reforming RICO: If Why, and How?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1990); see also United States v.
Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979) (warning prosecutors against using "undue
prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Reed, supra note 6,
at 695 (positing that provisions for asset forfeiture and treble damages encourage aggressive
use of RICO by government counsel).
20. James Cook, But Where are the Don's Yachts?, FORBES, Oct. 21, 1991, at 121.
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wields control.21 As the Mafia obtained authority and the ability to exert
control over legitimate business by virtue of its financial position,22 the cre-
ators of RICO hoped to finally23 create a means by which to diminish the
role of the Mafia and organized crime within the United States by impairing
the financial bases of the nation's criminal organizations.24 However, it is
only recently, two decades after the enactment of RICO, that the unprece-
dented success of the statute may be recognized.25
A. La Cosa Nostra
The Italian phrase "La Cosa Nostra" loosely translates to English as "Our
Thing" or "Our Family," and the group that it references is commonly rec-
ognized in America as the Mafia.26 For many decades, the complex struc-
ture and virtual invisibility of the Mafia kept most Americans unaware of its
existence, and left most law enforcement officials unable to infiltrate or
understand its operation.27 Since 1950, however, efforts of United States
Senate investigative committees, under the leadership of Senators Estes
Kefauver and John McClellan, have revealed much of the secret world of La
Cosa Nostra to the public.28
1. Structure and Internal Code of Conduct
La Cosa Nostra is a refined and complex organization of career criminals
that demands complete subservience and loyalty from its carefully chosen
members. 29 Through their association with the organization, members share
in the enormous profits of the crime family's illegal enterprises, while often
21. Id.
22. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
23. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty encountered by
the federal government in lessening the presence of the Mafia during a time period ranging
from 1950 to 1969).
24. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 44-47.
25. Nordland, supra note 7, at 34.
26. See Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 80 (1963) [hereinafter McClellan Committee Hearings] (testimony of Mafia member Jo-
seph Valachi).
27. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1 (discussing the structure of
the Mafia and how it is designed to ensure maximum secrecy).
28. See generally McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26 (investigating the degree
to which the Mafia had infiltrated legitimate business); REPORT OF THE SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 307,
1st Sess. (1951) [hereinafter KEFAUVER COMMITFEE REPORT] (noting the existence of La
Cosa Nostra).
29. McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26, at 2 (opening remarks of Senator John
L. McClellan).
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enjoying protection from government prosecution.30 Along with the benefits
of membership in La Cosa Nostra, members must pledge obedience and un-
questioned loyalty to all more senior members and face the penalty of death
for any lack of conformance to the mandates of the organization.31
A "Commission" consisting of the heads of the most powerful local crime
families controls all Mafia activity within the United States.32 The Commis-
sion serves in a capacity similar to the board of directors of a large conglom-
erate, orchestrating the interaction among the various families and resolving
any disputes that may arise. 3 Although the Commission acts as a body to
make key decisions for La Cosa Nostra, members of the Commission are not
equals.34 At one time, the Commission was led by one man, known as the
"Boss of all Bosses."35 In theory, the Mafia has eliminated this style of man-
agement, yet in practice, one or two of the governing members dominate the
Commission. 36 Beneath this Commission level, each local family has its own
management structure.
Local Mafia families are sophisticated organizations with hierarchical
structures similar to that of a legitimate business entity.37 At the top of the
structure is the "Boss," who acts as the head of the crime family but does
not participate in the day-to-day operation of the organization.3" The Boss
does, however, receive a substantial portion of the income generated from
each of the organization's revenue.39 The "Underboss" ' is the second in
command of each local family and is generally groomed to succeed the
Boss.41 The Underboss serves as a liaison between the Boss and the lower-
ranked members of the organization and in the event that the Boss becomes
ill or is unable to run the organization, the Underboss will act as interim
manager.42 The "Caporegima" (Captain) and the "Soldier" both serve be-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 8; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 13, at 37. The Commission is comprised of the bosses of the five New York crime fami-
lies, as well as the bosses from several other select, powerful families in Buffalo, Chicago,
Detroit, and Philadelphia. Id.; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 8.
33. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 37.
34. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 8.
35. McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26, at 80 (testimony of Mafia member
Joseph Valachi).
36. Id.
37. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
38. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 39.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7 (explaining the Task Force
findings as to the internal structure of the Mafia).
41. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 39.
42. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
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neath the Underboss.43 These two groups of individuals are buffers between
the upper echelon and the underlings of the organization." They are
equivalent to supervisors or sales managers in a legitimate business and are
responsible for the daily operation of various facets of the criminal organiza-
tion, yet they do not have the wide-scale decision-making abilities of the
higher-ranking officials.45 Integral to the crime family are the individuals
referred to collectively as the "protectors." 46 This group consists of mem-
bers from the law enforcement, legal, banking, and accounting communities,
who, through bribery and corruption, are persuaded to protect the organiza-
tion from governmental action.47
Within the Mafia, rank is strictly adhered to, and all members pay defer-
ence to those ranked above them.48 When members of different families in-
teract, the interaction occurs only among members of the same rank.49
Elaborate plans must be made, and a significant reason must be given, for
the encounter if a lower-ranking member of a family requests an in-person
meeting with one of his superiors. 50 Vows of loyalty and obedience, in con-
junction with the strict observance of rank, serve to insulate the highest-
ranking members from detection by law enforcement officials; it is assumed
that the lower-ranking members will go to jail so that the high-ranking mem-
bers can escape prosecution and continue to prosper.5'
In addition to the established rituals regarding structure and the code of
conduct, most other actions within the organization also follow a strict pro-
tocol, such as that which surrounds the making of a new member.52 One
cannot simply decide to join the Mafia. To be "made" each prospective
member must have a "sponsor" who vouches for the protege's qualifica-
tions.5 3 A sponsor watches a prospective member from childhood, ensuring
that the candidate has the qualities necessary to succeed in the organization,
43. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 39.
44. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7-8. By directly exposing the lowest ranking
members to law enforcement, higher ranking members are insulated from criminal prosecu-
tion. See id. at 8.
45. Id.
46. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 41.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 44.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26, at 91-92 (testimony of Mafia
member Joseph Valachi) (discussing a meeting Valachi arranged between a lower-ranked
member of his family and Boss Vito Genovese).
51. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.
52. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 42-43.
53. Id.; see also infra note 86 (discussing the meaning of the term "made" within the
Mafia).
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before actively promoting membership. 4 Eventually, the candidate's name
is circulated among the members of the Commission for their approval."
Once approved for membership, the candidate takes an oath "that the organ-
ization will be foremost in his life" '56 and that he will only be separated from
the organization by death." Notably, should the prospective member not
perform to the organizations expectations, the sponsor's life may be the price
exacted to repay the protege's failings.58
Loyalty, respect, and obedience are at the heart of the Mafia's structure
and code of conduct.5 9 These characteristics are central to the organiza-
tion's ability to maintain anonymity while functioning effectively." It is
partially as a result of this highly organized management structure that
the Mafia is able to work so efficiently in both the legal and the illegal
marketplaces.61
2. The Business of the Mafia
The core of La Cosa Nostra's power in American society comes from the
profits of the organization's illegal activities.62 At the time Congress began
investigating the Mafia, the organization was primarily engaged in gambling
and loan sharking operations.63 In the early 1950s, gambling provided the
main source of income for organized crime families." However, the activi-
ties of the Mafia also encompassed other illegal activities such as narcotics
trafficking, prostitution, labor and business racketeering, and black market-
ing. Currently, the distribution and sale of narcotics is the primary source
54. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 42-43. Prospective members gener-
ally must be Italian males. Id. Also, most candidates for membership have a background in
crime and must commit a contract crime, such as a murder, with another member of the
organization before they are inducted into the group. Id.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id. at 43.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 42-43. "This is no casual relationship, since the sponsor's life may be in jeop-
ardy if the initiate later turns 'sour.'" Id.
59. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.
60. See id. at 8-10.
61. See id. (discussing the internal structure of the Mafia and explaining how that struc-
ture is integral to the functioning of the organization).
62. See id. at 2.
63. Id. at 2 & n.20.
64. Id. at 4; KEFAUVER COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 2. By 1951, gambling
operations within the United States involved approximately 70,000 people and grossed seven
billion dollars annually. See The Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and
Racketeering: Hearings on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1655, S. 1656, S. 1657 and S. 1665 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1961) [hereinafter Attorney General's
Program] (statement of Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States).
65. KEFAUVER COMMI rEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 1.
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of income for the Mafia, with gambling operations now a secondary source
of income.66 The profits gained from such illegal activities are generally in-
vested in and funneled through legitimate business ventures.67 It is through
this infiltration of legitimate businesses that the organization conceals its
criminal purpose and launders its criminal proceeds.68
Despite the varying sources of income of Mafia business, and its efforts to
conceal many of these sources, the Mafia's operations did not go unnoticed.
As the breadth of activity and manipulative powers of the Mafia increased,
so too did the resulting negative effects on United States citizens and the
economy.69 Hence, the government began actively to investigate organized
crime in the United States and, more specifically, the operations of the
Mafia.7°
B. RICO: The Federal Response to the Mafia
Although a full-scale federal investigation of the Mafia began in the early
1950s, the government struggled for two decades to define an effective means
to combat this criminal organization. Despite the fact that the Mafia was
the government's clear target, constitutional considerations mandated that
any legislation be broadly drafted to encompass all organized crime, not just
La Cosa Nostra.71 The government did realize, however, that because the
Mafia's entire power base centered around its economic position in society,
the only way to dismantle the Mafia was to eliminate its fiscal base.72
Finally, in 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
66. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 11; see also United States v.
Gambino, 734 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing the background and basis for a
motion to suppress evidence and explaining that the indictment implicated the defendants in a
narcotics distribution scheme, the income from which was often supplemented with the in-
come from illegal gambling operations).
67. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
68. See id.
69. When the Mafia exerts economic pressure on the marketplace, the stock market can
be manipulated, the price of retail merchandise can rise or fall, and politicians and law enforce-
ment officials can be bought. Id. at 2.
70. See infra notes 71-103 and accompanying text.
71. Pamela R. Chepiga, Criminal RICO.- Guidelines and Applications, in RICO: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY § 5.01 (Jed S. Rakoff & Howard W. Goldstein eds.
1992). The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of statutes that criminalize actions based
upon a person's status. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Chepiga, supra, § 5.01; Reed, supra note
6, at 693; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1962) (finding a California law
criminalizing drug addiction unconstitutional on Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual pun-
ishment grounds).
72. See Senator John L. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 141 (1970). Through RICO's asset
forfeiture provisions, the government has the legal capability to obliterate a criminal organiza-
tion's financial base. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b)-(c) (1988).
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Organizations Act (RICO)," providing the government with a mechanism
for eradicating organized crime.74
1. Legislative Design and Intent
The awareness of organized crime, as fostered by the Kefauver Committee
in 1951, the McClellan Committee in 1963, and the President's Task Force
on Organized Crime in 1967, provided the original impetus behind the crea-
tion of RICO.75 The Kefauver Committee, set up as a special Senate com-
mittee to investigate organized crime in interstate commerce, was the first
public governmental body to focus wide public attention on the scope of
Mafia activities.76 The Committee's mandate included investigating the de-
gree to which organized crime had permeated interstate commerce, identify-
ing the structure and possible members of the criminal underground, and
determining whether interstate criminal organizations were violating any
state or federal laws.77
The Kefauver Committee Report, published in 1951, provided a relatively
detailed summary of the structure and operation of the Mafia within the
United States.7' The Committee suggested that although much of the law
73. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
74. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 79. With the knowledge that many
criminal organizations were run from jail when family leaders were incarcerated, the creators
of RICO aimed not only to incarcerate the criminal bosses but also to eliminate the economic
structure that supported the organization. Id.
The criminal and civil sanctions of the statute were designed to work together to eradicate
the criminal organization. The "criminal" RICO provisions were to be used to put key mem-
bers of the organizations in jail, while the "civil" RICO treble damages and asset forfeiture
provisions worked to dismantle the financial base of the crime family. Id.
75. See generally McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26 (expanding on the work
of the Kefauver Committee); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10 (continuing to investigate
the operation of the Mafia); KEFAUVER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 28 (exposing the
public to the existence and operations of the Mafia).
76. See McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26, at 9 (testimony of Hon. Robert F.
Kennedy, United States Attorney General).
77. KEFAUVER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 20.
78. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1 nn.1, 7 (quoting KEFAUVER COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 28, at 150, 170-71.) Specifically, the Committee found that:
"1. There is a Nation-wide crime syndicate known as the Mafia, whose tentacles
are found in many large cities. It has international ramifications which appear most
clearly in connection with the narcotics traffic.
2. Its leaders are usually found in control of the most lucrative rackets in their
cities.
3. There are indications of a centralized direction and control of these rackets,
but leadership appears to be in a group rather than in a single individual.
5. The domination of the Mafia is based fundamentally on 'muscle' and 'murder.'
The Mafia is a secret conspiracy against law and order which will ruthlessly elimi-
nate anyone who stands in the way of its success in any criminal enterprise in which
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enforcement effort surrounding organized crime needed to be conducted on
state and local levels, the federal government also had to undertake signifi-
cant responsibility in this area.79 Accordingly, the Kefauver Committee
proposed that the federal government be charged with depriving criminal
organizations of illegally obtained proceeds."0 Other recommendations of
the Kefauver Committee stressed the need for a continuing Senate investiga-
tion of organized crime, and suggested that an independent executive com-
mission be established."' Thereafter, the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Relations, now
popularly referred to as the McClellan Committee, was formed. 2 In form-
ing this new Committee, Congress alluded to several historic and troubling
findings of the Kefauver Committee and finally began to vigorously pursue
legislation aimed at eradicating organized crime.
8 3
On March 14, 1963, the Senate adopted a resolution that authorized the
McClellan Committee "to make a full and complete study and investiga-
tion" of organized crime.8 4 Subsequently, the McClellan Committee ex-
panded upon the investigation of La Cosa Nostra initiated by the Kefauver
Committee. 5 In 1963, for the first time, the government was able to ques-
tion candidly a "made" member 6 when the McClellan Committee secured
the testimony of Joseph Valachi, a member of La Cosa Nostra who was
it is interested. It will destroy anyone who betrays its secrets. It will use any means
available - political influence, bribery, intimidation, etc., to defeat any attempt on
the part of law-enforcement to touch its top figures or to interfere with its
operations."
Id at I n.1 (quoting KEFAUVER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 150).
There can be little doubt that the public suffers from gangster penetration into
legitimate business. It suffers because higher prices must be paid for articles and
services which it must buy ... The public suffers because it may have to put up with
shoddy and inferior merchandise in fields where gangsters have been able to obtain a
monopoly.
Id. at 1 n.7 (quoting KEFAUVER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 170-71).
79. KEFAUVER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
80. Id. at 7-8.
81. Id.
82. See generally McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26 (expanding on the Mafia
investigations begun by the Kefauver Committee).
83. Attorney General's Program, supia note 64, at 2 (citing the results of the Kefauver
Committee and their effect on the nation).
84. McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26, at 1 (opening remarks of Senator John
L. McClellan).
85. See id. at 9 (statement of Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, United States Attorney General).
86. The term "made" is a term of art within the Mafia that refers to a full-fledged member
of the organization. Generally a "made" member must commit a crime, usually a contract
murder, to prove his allegiance to the Family. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note
13, at 42-43.
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serving a life prison sentence for murder.8 7 The testimony both confirmed
what the government had presumed to be the organizational structure of the
Mafia"8 and provided the government with new insights into the organiza-
tion's secret code of conduct. s9 More importantly, the McClellan Commit-
tee was able to gain valuable insights that would later prove instrumental in
creating legislation aimed at eradicating organized crime in the United
States. In the interim, a 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime
was created to further investigate the Mafia.9' Building on the information
accumulated by previous studies, the Task Force produced a well-docu-
mented report containing several recommendations for legislative action in
the organized crime arena.91 Although legislation was immediately intro-
duced in response to these recommendations, 9' none of the bills successfully
moved through Congress.
Subsequently, Senator McClellan, who had long been involved with efforts
to identify and formulate ways to prosecute the Mafia,93 co-sponsored a
1969 bill entitled the "Organized Crime Control Act" (the "Act"). 94 Title
IX of the Act, entitled "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,"
combined several pieces of organized crime legislation to form one compre-
hensive criminal statute.9 ' The Judiciary Committee Report accompanying
the bill indicates that the government intended RICO to be its tool in
87. McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26, at 78-121, 136-202, 213-32.
88. Id. at 80-82. Valachi stated that the hierarchy within La Cosa Nostra included a
"griemeson" or "commission" that controls the overall operation of all American Mafia Fami-
lies and that each family has a "boss," "underboss," "caporegima," and "soldiers." Id. at 80.
Valachi also discussed issues of protocol within the Mafia, such as the procedure that a lower-
ranking member would have to follow to speak with the Boss of his crime family. Id. at 91-
92. Through his testimony, Valachi also revealed some of the more clandestine nuances of the
Mafia, including the manner by which members of La Cosa Nostra recognize each other when
drastic steps are taken to keep the identities of all members of the organization, especially the
Bosses, so secret. Id. at 83. According to Valachi, when one member of La Cosa Nostra
introduced someone who was also a member to a third member, the person would say this is
"'a friend of ours.' " Id. (emphasis added). By contrast, if the person being introduced was
not a member of La Cosa Nostra, the greeting would be "'Meet a friend of mine.'" Id.
(emphasis added).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 29-61.
90. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
91. Id.
92. See S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
93. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1017.
94. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Title IX of the bill is entitled "Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 21 (1969).
95. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1017-21. Immediately after the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice released the 1967 Task Force
Report on Organized Crime, two bills were introduced in the Senate which addressed the
economic aspects of organized crime by levying antitrust-type penalties on certain activities.
This legislation, however, never left the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id. at 1015-16. S. 30
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mounting a "frontal attack" on organized crime,9 6 as all previous attempts
to deal with organized crime had been insufficient.97
Congress intended that the RICO statute be used, inter alia, to prosecute
highly sophisticated criminal organizations deriving profits from activities
such as loan sharking, gambling, and narcotics activities, and later using the
resulting profits to infiltrate legitimate businesses.9" In addition, RICO pro-
vided the government with a means for enhancing the sanctions against or-
ganized criminal entities and for increasing the scope of remedies available
to the government to combat organized crime.99 These remedies included
penalties for both "substantive" RICO violations"°° and RICO "conspiracy"
also incorporated provisions of S. 1861, which enlarged the scope of crimes that could be
prosecuted under RICO. Id.
96. JUDICIARY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 78.
97. Id.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (Congressional Statement of Findings and
Purpose). Congress outlined several characteristics of the types of organizations within the
scope of RICO:
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified and
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy
by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized
crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal
endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking... [and] the importation and dis-
tribution of narcotics... ; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infil-
trate and corrupt legitimate business[es] . . . ; (4) organized crime activities in the
United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent
investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously bur-
den interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine
the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues
to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process ....
Id.
99. Id.
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988). The substantive RICO provisions prohibit the
following activity:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal . . . to use or
invest... any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain.., any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's af-
fairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id.; see also Tarlow, supra, note 3, at 180-243.
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violations,' ° ' as well as an asset forfeiture provision."°2 After almost two
years of debate and revision, Congress enacted the bill on September 23,
1970, and the President signed it into law on October 15, 1970.103
2. Clarification of the Design and Intent of RICO
Despite the enactment of RICO, the formulation of commissions and task
forces to study further organized crime and to increase knowledge about
these enigmatic organizations has continued. I°" In particular, a 1986 Presi-
dential Commission Report outlined a framework for defining organized
criminal groups based on their structural and behavioral characteristics.'I 5
This framework has proven helpful in defining criminal groups that fall
within the scope of RICO's provisions, thus becoming clear targets for
RICO prosecutions.
To fit within the identified framework, a criminal organization must dis-
play the following characteristics: continuity of operations over a long
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988). The RICO conspiracy provision states: "(d) It shall
be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b),
or (c) of this section." Id. Unlike traditional conspiracy, RICO conspiracy does not necessar-
ily require proof of an overt predicate act. To establish a RICO conspiracy, the prosecutor
must simply show that the defendant agreed to participate in the affairs of the enterprise, with
the purpose of furthering the criminal objectives of the enterprise. United States v. Elliott, 571
F.2d 880, 902-03 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); see also Tarlow, supra, note 3, at
245-57.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). This provision makes available asset forfeitures that at-
tach upon a RICO conviction and states:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 . . . shall forfeit to the United
States, irrespective of any state law -





(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence
over; any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled,
conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection
in violation of section 1962.
Id. For a discussion of the RICO asset forfeiture provisions, see Tarlow, supra note 3, at 276-
91.
103. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 900 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S.
576 (1981).
104. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME (1976). The Federal Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration formed the Task Force, with the support of President Jimmy Carter. See
generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13.
105. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 26-29.
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period of time; °6 a hierarchical management structure;10 7 restricted mem-
bership based upon a common trait among the individuals in the group;'05
reliance on continuing criminal activity as a source of income;"° systematic
violence used as a means of control and protection; ° and a motivation to
enhance its power in the community and its level of profits."' By using this
framework in assessing the application of RICO to criminal organizations, it
is possible to frame RICO prosecutions to target only those criminal organi-
zations that fit within the design and intent of the statutory provisions.
C. Traditional Use of RICO in Mafia Prosecutions
Because Mafia prosecutions under RICO did not develop largely until the
1980s," 2 the majority of cases demonstrating the "traditional ' " 3 use of
RICO has occurred within the past decade. Many of the most successful
RICO prosecutions involve Mafia crime families who have infiltrated legiti-
mate businesses.' 14 However, while the Mafia, white collar criminals, and
figures involved in public corruption are all favorable and traditional targets
for such prosecutions,"' all federal RICO prosecutions must first be ap-
proved by the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section at the Department
of Justice (DOJ)." 6 The governing policies promulgated by DOJ are
106. Id. at 26. The group must continue to exist beyond the lifetimes of it's members. Id.
107. Id. There must be identifiable ranks within the organization. Id.
108. Id. at 27.
109. Id. at 28. Illegal activities provide a means of financing the operation. Proceeds are
laundered through legitimate organizations to conceal their criminal origins. Id.
110. Id. at 28-29.
111. Id. at 29. It is essential that the group have protectors who safeguard the mission of
the organization and insulate the organization from law enforcement. Id.
112. See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUMMARIES OF SPEECHES TO NAAG SEMINARS, PROSECUTING OR-
GANIZED CRIME (1974) (providing excerpts from speeches, none of which mentioned RICO,
made by staff members of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice regarding methods to investigate and prosecute organized crime).
113. The term "traditional" is used by the author to refer to the initial intention of Con-
gress to create RICO to eradicate the Mafia. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
(Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose).
114. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
115. Dennis, supra note 5, at 652-54.
116. Coffey, supra note 2, at 1043. The procedure begins when prosecutors at United
States Attorneys' Offices throughout the nation prepare proposals outlining prospective RICO
prosecutions and submit them to the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section at DOJ for
approval. Id. DOJ will not prosecute a case under RICO unless it meets at least one or more
of the following prosecution guidelines:
1. RICO is necessary to ensure that the indictment adequately reflects the nature
and extent of the criminal conduct involved in a way that prosecution only on the
underlying charges would not;
2. a RICO prosecution would provide the basis for an appropriate sentence under all
of the circumstances of the case;
1993]
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designed to place "strict internal review and controls" on all RICO actions
initiated by the government, as well as to proscribe the scope of federal
RICO prosecutions."" Thus, a maintainable RICO prosecution must reflect
the current RICO policies of DOJ," which in turn reflect the stated intent
of the RICO statute." 9 In addition to compliance with DOJ policies and
oversight, the charged entity in a RICO prosecution must fall within RICO's
statutory provisions.
120
1. Application of Pertinent RICO Provisions
Congress enacted RICO to broaden the scope of organized crime prosecu-
tions by allowing the prosecution of the entire history of a criminal organiza-
tion's illegal acts, including multiple acts committed by a wide range of
persons, rather than perpetuating the practice of separately prosecuting indi-
vidual crimes within a pattern of activity. 12 1 While controversy continues
regarding the intent, use, and application of RICO, the law has proven suc-
cessful in ongoing attempts to eradicate organized crime.
122
3. a RICO charge could combine related offenses which would otherwise have to be
prosecuted separately in different jurisdictions;
4. RICO is necessary for a successful prosecution of the government's case against
the defendant or a co-defendant;
5. use of RICO would provide a reasonable expectation of forfeiture which is pro-
portionate to the underlying criminal conduct;
6. the case consists of violations of state law, but local law enforcement officials are
unlikely or unable to successfully prosecute the case, in which the federal govern-
ment has a significant interest;
7. the case consists of violations of state law, but involves prosecution of significant
political or government individuals, which may pose special problems for the local
prosecutor.
ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER IN-
FLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECU-
TORS 128 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter OCRS MANUAL]. For example, DOJ will not prosecute a
case that focuses entirely on "narcotics trafficking, extortionate debt collection, or gambling"
since other, less complicated federal statutes can be used to prosecute these cases. Coffey,
supra note 2, at 1044-45; see, e.g., Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) (setting
forth penalties and forfeitures for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise). The DOJ
guidelines were created and then revised in response to criticism that the government was
using RICO to prosecute persons that did not fit within the intended scope of the law.
Chepiga, supra note 71, § 5.01. As such, these guidelines are specific and aimed at limiting the
potential for prosecutorial abuse.
117. See Dennis, supra note 5, at 652-54; Reed, supra note 6, at 695-96.
118. Coffey, supra note 2, at 1043.
119. Chepiga, supra note 71, § 5.01.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988).
121. Rudolph W. Giuliani, Legal Remedies for Attacking Organized Crime, in U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, MAJOR ISSUES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL 103, 105 (Herbert Edelhertz ed.,
1987) (hereinafter MAJOR ISSUES].
122. See supra note 16; see, e.g., Second Thoughts on RICO, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989, at
14A (calling upon Congress to reform RICO); Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases
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Two key RICO provisions require that a defendant must have been part of
an "enterprise" and that the "enterprise" must be engaged in an ongoing
"pattern of racketeering activity" in order to be prosecuted under the stat-
ute.123 The definition of "enterprise" is broad, encompassing any legally rec-
ognized or non-legal association of a group of individuals. Specifically,
"'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."' 24 Courts have generally interpreted this defini-
tion broadly, thereby allowing many different types of entities to be prose-
cuted under RICO.
125
Similarly, the "pattern of racketeering activity" element of RICO is de-
fined as committing at least two acts of racketeering, with at least one act
occurring after the effective date of the statute, and the subsequent act(s)
occurring within ten years of the first act, excluding any period of imprison-
ment.' 26 This element requires proof of continuity and some relationship
between the events in the pattern.127 The nexus may be proven by demon-
strating that the acts, even though they appear to be unrelated in nature,
were committed under the direction of the "enterprise."' 28 Thus, the organ-
ization may simultaneously meet both the "enterprise" and "pattern of rack-
eteering" elements.'
29
Out of My Court, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989, at 14A (arguing for congressional limitations on
RICO).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
125. Blakey, supra note 4, at 1079-85 (opening remarks of G. Robert Blakey).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
127. United States v. Anguilo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1179 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 130
(1990). In the context of a Mafia prosection, it is sufficient for the prosecutor to prove that the
acts were related to the RICO "enterprise." Id. at 1180.
128. Id.
129. See id. One important aspect of the RICO statute is that by focusing on a continuing
course of conduct, it allows the federal government's indictment to include counts involving
state crimes for which the statute of limitations has already run, and crimes for which the
defendant has already been tried or acquitted of at the state court level. Although this aspect
has provoked controversy because of its alleged incompatibility with the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment courts have generally found such claims to be without merit.
See Abate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does
not bar federal prosecution of a conspiracy charge on which defendants were convicted in state
court); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1086 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that a convic-
tion on a conspiracy charge under RICO was not barred by the Fifth Amendment), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978). In United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1047 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that an acquittal on state bribery charges did not preclude indictment under RICO on
double jeopardy grounds. Id. The court reasoned that the federal crime for which the defend-
ant was charged was racketeering, and not the state crime of bribery. Id. Further, mention of
the state bribery crime was only necessary in order to define the nature of the substantive
federal racketeering charge and to determine whether the federal charge had merit. Id. (citing
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2. Landmark Mafia Cases
Several courts have had an opportunity to address the application of perti-
nent RICO statutory provisions in the context of criminal organization pros-
ecutions. In the 1982 case of United States v. Turkette, 130 the United States
Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether the term "enterprise" in the
RICO statute referred exclusively to illegitimate organizations or whether
some portion of the organization must involve a legitimate business.' 3 1 The
defendants in Turkette were charged with operating a criminal organization
engaged primarily in narcotics trafficking, arson, mail fraud, insurance
fraud, and corruption of public officials.' 32 Unlike previous RICO cases,"33
the defendants in Turkette operated a completely illicit business.' 34 The de-
fendants argued that they were exempt from the scope of RICO since it was
enacted to protect legitimate businesses from infiltration by racketeers and
not to protect illegal organizations from racketeers. 135
United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972));
see also United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that double
jeopardy clause is not violated when two prior drug convictions served as the basis for predi-
cate acts under RICO), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987); United States v. Boldin, 772 F.2d
719, 728-30 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (holding that a prior drug conviction can be used as a predicate
act under RICO); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367 (8th Cir. 1980) (explaining
that the "enterprise" element is central to the constitutionality of the RICO statute because it
provides protection against multiple prosecutions for the same crime), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
912 (1981).
130. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
131. Id at 578.
132. Id. at 579.
133. Turkette was a case of first impression in the First Circuit. See United States v.
Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980) (reversing the defendant's RICO conviction), rev'd, 452
U.S. 576 (1981). In deciding Turkette, the First Circuit split with the other circuits by holding
that wholly illegitimate organizations were not within the scope of the term "enterprise." Id.
at 904-06. Compare id. with United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir. 1980)
(holding that RICO is not limited in application to legitimate organizations), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981) and United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1980) (same), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 911 (1981) and United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 992-93 (3d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) and United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525
n. 1 (4th Cir. 1980) (same) and United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1979)
(same), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) and United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th
Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied 445 U.S. 946 (1980) and United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d
1246, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979) and United States v.
Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 896-98 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). But see Rone,
598 F.2d at 573-74 (Ely, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress intended RICO to apply only to
legitimate enterprises); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1976) (van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (asserting that Congress intended RICO to apply solely to legiti-
mate organizations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
134. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579.
135. Id. at 579-80.
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The Court, looking to the legislative history of the statute, found that
RICO clearly encompassed both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.
36
The Supreme Court asserted that § 1961(4)'s definition of the term "enter-
prise" consists of two components: one referring to legitimate organizations
and the other referring to illegitimate organizations. 137 The Court further
recognized that since the purpose of RICO was to eradicate organized crime,
the exclusion of illegitimate organizations from the scope of the law would
frustrate the intended use of the statute. 13' The Supreme Court thereby sig-
naled prosecutors that RICO was an acceptable means by which to prose-
cute both partially and exclusively illegitimate organizations.
39
In some of the more notable prosecutions, RICO has been used to cripple,
if not dismantle, several of the most influential Mafia families in the coun-
try."4 In United States v. Castellano,4 ' twenty-four defendants were
charged in a seventy-eight count indictment.'42 The first two counts of the
indictment alleged eighty separate acts of racketeering in violation of sub-
stantive RICO provisions 43 and an even greater number of violations of
RICO conspiracy charges." In substance, the defendants were charged
with operating a local Mafia family, the Gambino crime family, whose pri-
mary activities included murder, bribery, obstruction of justice, extortion,
narcotics trafficking, mail and wire fraud, and prostitution.1
45
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
reasoned that the "crew," under the supervision of a "boss" and "captain,"
fell within the scope of the RICO "enterprise" definition as the organization
136. Id. at 590. "Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily
have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, 'legitimate.'" Id. at 581.
137. Id. at 582.
138. Id. at 590-91.
139. Dennis, supra note 5, at 653.
140. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Although the Mafia is a nation-wide crime
syndicate, the greatest concentration of Mafia prosecutions has occurred in the Northeast,
especially in the Second Circuit. This can be attributed to the fact that the five most powerful
Mafia crime families all operate within the metropolitan New York City area.
141. 610 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
142. Id. at 1378.
143. Id The substantive RICO provisions state that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to con-
duct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
144. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. at 1378-79; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988) (stating that "[i]t
shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a),
(b), or (c) of this section").
145. 610 F. Supp. at 1378. The district court was especially careful during the trial to
avoid direct references to the "Gambino family" and the "Mafia." See United States v. Gaggi,
811 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987).
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had a clear hierarchical structure and a common group of members who
shared an ongoing business interest. 146 Further, the court stated that this
particular enterprise conformed to the profile of individuals that Congress
intended to be prosecuted under RICO provisions.' 47 Finally, the court ex-
plicitly concluded that the "crew" also met the RICO "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" element by virtue of the illicit activities conducted under the
direction of the Gambino crime family.'4 '
Similarly, in United States v. Angiulo,149 members of the Patriarca crime
family were charged with substantive RICO violations and RICO conspir-
acy."'° Each of the five defendants, alleged high-ranking members in the
Patriarca crime family,' 5 ' were convicted at trial.'52 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the constitutionality
of RICO provisions. 53 The defendants argued that the term "pattern"
within the "pattern of racketeering" element was so unclear as to render the
statute void for vagueness.1 4 In evaluating this claim, the court reasoned
that in order for the statute to be found void for vagueness, it must be vague
as to the defendant's conduct in the particular case at bar. 1"5 While conced-
ing that the "pattern of racketeering" element could cause uncertainty in
some situations, the court held that in an organized crime setting, a void for
vagueness claim must fail.' 56 Drawing on the legislative intent of RICO and
the Supreme Court's recognition that the main focus of the statute was or-
ganized crime,"' the First Circuit concluded that an ordinary person would
know that the activities of an organized crime family fell within the range of
conduct that could be prosecuted under RICO.'
5 8
146. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. at 1392.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 130 (1990).
150. Id. at 1175.
151. Id. at 1176.
152. Id. at 1175.
153. Id. at 1178. The defendants specifically challenged the "pattern of racketeering" ele-
ment, alleging that it was "so enigmatic and ambiguous as to be void for vagueness." Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1179. The court explained that to sustain a vagueness challenge, the defendants
would have to show that "persons of ordinary intelligence in their situation would not have
had adequate notice that the gambling [and] loansharking ... constituted a 'pattern of racke-
teering activity' under RICO." Id.
156. Id. at 1179-80. "[I]f anything is clear about RICO, it is that 'a pattern of racketeering
activity' is intended to encompass the activities of organized crime families." Id. at 1179.
157. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 492 U.S. 229, 245 (1989); see also United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-93 (1981).
158. Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1180. Specifically, the court stated that:
[A]lthough RICO's 'pattern' element may be vague in some contexts ... it is not
vague in the context before us. A person of ordinary intelligence could not help but
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RICO was successfully used to prosecute organized crime families in these
and other similar cases.1 59 Continued successes may ensue if prosecutions
are based on RICO as designed, intended, and clarified. 1"° Further, the
scope and meaning of DOJ prosecution guidelines and the language of
RICO provisions must be given careful attention.16 1 RICO has proven to be
instrumental in dismantling the power of the Mafia over the last decade
when these procedures are followed. 6 2 Today, however, organized crime
has acquired a new face that must also be investigated and dismantled.
II. THE NEW FACE OF ORGANIZED CRIME
In many areas throughout the country, both urban and rural, street gangs
are emerging as a powerful organized criminal force. Street gangs are not a
new phenomena; they have been in existence as fraternal street corner
organizations for centuries.163 What is new and troubling is their recent
evolution from relatively innocuous street corner gangs to ruthless and so-
phisticated criminal organizations." In an effort to combat this trend and
its companion increase in violent crimes, and owing to the striking similari-
ties between sophisticated urban street gangs and Mafia organizations, the
United States government has begun to use the RICO statute to prosecute
highly sophisticated urban street gangs.
1 65
realize that illegal activities of an organized crime family fall within the ambit of
RICO's pattern of racketeering activity.
Id.
159. See generally United States v. Salerno, 964 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming the
district court's refusal to vacate a RICO conviction on double jeopardy grounds); United
States v. Pugnitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming a RICO conviction of members of
the Scarfo crime family), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2009 (1991); United States v. Licavoli, 725
F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.) (affirming the RICO convictions of leaders of a Cleveland organized crime
family), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); United States v. Scarfo, 711 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) (denying all post-trial motions and finding that defendants received a fair and impar-
tial trial), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Pugnitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, III S. Ct. 2009 (1991); United States v. Persisco, 621 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(ruling on pre-trial motions and finding that the RICO indictment, joinder of defendants, and
sequestration of an anonymous jury were proper).
160. See supra notes 75-111 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 7.
163. TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 1-4.
164. See William Recktenwald & Jennifer Lenhart, The Killing Way Weighs Heavily:
Homicide Rate has New Meaning in Two Communities, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1992, at Cl ("In
some areas, you're getting a transformation from gangs which are not only youth gangs to
something much closer to organized crime .... ").
165. See, e.g., United States v. Williams-Davis, Crim. No. 91-0559 (GHR), 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1176 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1992) (prosecuting the R Street Crew).
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A. Defining Urban Street Gangs: The Criminal Organization of the 1990s
The terms "street gang" and "gang activity" are difficult to define with
clarity and specificity.' 66 However, there are several readily identifiable
characteristics commonly associated with both terms which make it possible
to loosely identify urban street gangs and their specific patterns of activity,
thereby providing evidence of the evolving criminal nature of such enti-
ties. 161 Such evidence also demonstrates that the evolution from a street
corner gang to a sophisticated illicit enterprise occurs over a period of sev-
eral years and involves many phases of development.
161
1. The Structure and Activity of the Sophisticated Urban Street Gang
Gangs have historically evolved spontaneously, organizing for no specific
purpose.169 In order for the gang to thrive, frequent contact among the gang
members is necessary;' 7 ° the gang ceases to exist if members do not interact
with each other on a regular basis, planning their activities and future as a
group.' 7' In order to solidify, the gang must face conflict as a group to
develop morale.' 72 Finally, the gang must obtain control over some portion
of local territory and develop a hierarchical management structure based
upon social interaction within the group.' 73
The street corner gang begins its transformation into a sophisticated crim-
inal group by acquiring a loose organizational structure and engaging in
criminal activities to raise money for the gang and to protect the gang's
"turf."' 74 As the gang's involvement with the narcotics trade increases,
more violent crime becomes necessary in order to protect and expand the
gang's territory and narcotics business.' 75 Similarly, as the gang accrues
power and builds a reputation within the community, the crimes become
progressively more violent. 176 Once the gang has solidified an economic
166. Burrell, supra note 16, at 741-42.
167. See generally Edwin H. Stier & Peter R. Richards, Strategic Decision Making in Or-
ganized Crime Control: the Need for a Broadened Perspective, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note
121, at 65 (discussing the evolutionary stages of a typical organized crime group).
168. See id. at 66-73; TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 4-12.




172. Id. at 43-44.
173. Id. at 45.
174. See TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 6.
175. Id.
176. See Stier & Richards, supra note 167, at 67. Organized crime directs extreme violence
outward, toward the community, only in the earliest stages of development. Because the or-
ganization has not successfully infiltrated legitimate businesses, it needs the revenue from vio-
lent crimes to finance its operation. At this stage the criminal organization is most susceptible
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base and an established territory, it develops a more structured organiza-
tional format characterized by strong leadership. 77 At this stage, the gang
decreases its commission of minor street crimes and increases its involve-
ment in the illegal marketplace, providing an illegal service to the commu-
nity on a continuing basis.
171
In this developmental stage, drug trafficking, especially in crack cocaine,
becomes the focal point of many urban street gangs.179 The management
structure within such sophisticated urban street gangs is hierarchical and
efficient and is often based on the gang's drug-related activity. The drug-
involved gang is headed by a "kingpin" who oversees drug distribution
within the gang territory. 80 Under the kingpin is the "boss," who is the
general manager of the drug trafficking on the streets. 1 The lower-ranking
employees consist of the "lookout," the "hawker," the "steerer," the
"pitcher," the "stasher," the "runner," and the "bang-bang."' 18 2
The lookout, usually a child, is paid to monitor the streets, alert the street
salesman to the approach of the police, and learn about and report on the
description of unmarked police cars and undercover agents. '8 3 The hawker
is the salesman, responsible for soliciting potential customers.18 4  The
hawker directs an interested party to the steerer, who frisks the buyer and
to detection and prosecution. Id. As with the Mafia, the purpose of this stage is to build
wealth among the members and to solidify the organization.
177. Id. at 68-70; see also TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 7 (discussing "Organized/Corporate
gangs").
178. Stier & Richards, supra note 167, at 68. These services include "gambling, providing
financing at usurious interest rates, marketing narcotics, controlling prostitution, and the like."
Id.
179. William G. Skalitzky, Comment, Aider and Abettor Liability, the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise, and Street Gangs: A New Twist in an Old War on Drugs, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 348, 361 (1990). The sophistication of the gang's drug operation is often an accurate
indicator of the overall level of sophistication of the gang.
"The level of narcotics involvement by the individual gang is, however, directly re-
lated to the size of its membership and the degree of organizational sophistication
achieved by the gang. The smaller, less organized gangs are generally only involved
in selling drugs at the street level. As the gang grows and becomes more structured,
it develops more specialized distribution methods and expands its product."
Id (quoting SELECT COMM. ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
UPDATE ON DRUGS AND DROP-OuTS REPORT 19 (Comm. Print 1987)); see also S.C. Gwyne,
Up From the Streets; Instead of Dying Out, Detroit Gangs Have Been Reborn as Criminal Em-
pires, TIME, Apr. 30, 1990, at 34 (stating that the cocaine trade was the primary factor fueling
the rise of Detroit drug gangs).
180. Skalitzky, supra note 179, at 359.
181. Profits in a Risky Business, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1989, at 37 [hereinafter Risky Busi-
ness]. The "boss" receives the weekly shipments of cocaine and may personally oversee the
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attempts to ensure that the buyer is not an undercover officer.'" 5 Then the
pitcher retrieves drugs from the stasher and sells them to the buyer. 18 6 Fi-
nally, runners are in charge of any deliveries that need to be made, and bang-
bangs serve as enforcers, protecting the organization.
18 7
The drug trade provides the main source of income for sophisticated ur-
ban street gangs.' 8  Because crack cocaine is inexpensive, easily obtained,
and highly addictive, 189 it is ideally suited to be a commodity on the black
market. Narcotics trafficking enables the gangs to generate large incomes' 9°
while entrenching themselves in the community. When the community of
drug addicts has become physically and psychologically dependant upon
crack because of its wide availability and addictive nature, the gang's drug
trade becomes necessary to the functioning of everyday life.' 9' In addition,
gang members often use the profits derived from the illegal sale of crack,
among other narcotics, to bankroll their organizations and extravagant
lifestyles. 192
2. Recognizing the Impact of Sophisticated Urban Street Gangs on
Organized Crime
The crack cocaine trade is primarily responsible for transforming many
fraternal, juvenile organizations into highly sophisticated organized crime




188. See Skalitzky, supra note 179, at 348.
189. Lynn Wagner, Hospitals Feeling Trauma of Violence, Emergency Departments Suffer
as Drug-Related Injuries Soar, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 5, 1990, at 23.
190. "[A] $10,000 kilo of powdered cocaine can be converted, through the cooking process,
into three kilos of crack cocaine valued at $100,000." Skalitzky, supra note 179, at 364 (foot-
notes omitted). In 1985, it was estimated that one "crack house" could make anywhere from
several thousand to $25,000 in one day. Id.
191. This is analogous to local Mafia "bookies" who once catered to the compulsive gam-
blers of communities that did not have legalized gambling. For a general discussion of gam-
bling operations of Mafia families at the height of their power, see Attorney General's Program,
supra note 64, at 1-17 (statement of Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United
States). Given the highly addictive nature of crack cocaine, gangs may become even more
tightly entwined in the communities than Mafia "bookies" once were.
192. Skalitzky, supra note 179, at 355. The social communities in which these gangs flour-
ish are exceedingly materialistic. Gang members are motivated to make more money so that
they can drive the right cars, have the right clothes, and win the right women. For example,
gang leaders of the Washington, D.C.-based "R Street Crew" engaged in a "lavish" lifestyle
which included the regular purchase of $2,200 shoes, $80,000 cars, $300 bottles of cologne,
and the like. Catherine Toups, 3 in R Street Crew Guilty of Murder, Drug Counts; Verdicts
Ensure Life Sentences, WASH. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at Al; see also Gwyne, supra note 179, at
34 (stating that gang members crave money and status and are willing to kill to obtain them).
193. Skalitzky, supra note 179, at 348-49.
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the same economic and political power traditionally associated with more
sophisticated organized crime entities, such as the Mafia.194 Today, virtu-
ally every urban area within the United States houses sophisticated street
gangs; moreover, gangs no longer limit themselves to traditional urban set-
tings.195 As gangs become more prevalent in society, they become harder to
identify as criminal organizations.' 96 Thus, while the sophisticated street
gangs are often successful in infiltrating legitimate businesses, they continue
to walk a fine line between criminal and legal activities. 97
Other activities conducted by street gangs on a regular basis are usually
related to protecting and promoting their narcotics business.9 However,
some urban street gangs today have reached the level of "major crime and
terrorist organization[s],"' 99 engaging in racketeering activity other than
narcotics distribution, including terrorism,2 °° robbery, extortion, bribery,
kidnapping, and obstruction of justice.2° ' The existence and prevalence of
these criminal entities has spurred the federal government to focus its scru-
tiny on one of todays most devistating forms of organized crime-the sophis-
ticated urban street gang.
194. Stier & Richards, supra note 167, at 65. Drug gang Bosses will make a profit of
approximately $1,000,000 per year, while lower-ranking street-level employees can earn as
much as $5,000 per week. Risky Business, supra note 181, at 37.
195. West Coast gangs such as the "Bloods" and "Crips" have sent members into Middle
America to stake a claim in the burgeoning drug market. Roger Worthington & James Coates,
Migrating LA. Gangs Find New Turf in the Midwest, CHI. TrIB., May 1, 1988, at 23. The
incentive to move eastward is essentially fiscal, as the gangs can get two to three times as much
money for the drugs that they peddle. See id.
196. Steir & Richards, supra note 167, at 66.
197. Id. With traditional Mafia organizations, this fine line was evidenced by Mafia con-
trol of legitimate organizations which it used as "fronts" for criminal activities and to launder
money. See McClellan Committee Hearings, supra note 26, at 12-14 (testimony of Hon. Rob-
ert F. Kennedy, United States Attorney General) (discussing the means by which the Mafia
infiltrates legitimate businesses); JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76-78 (dis-
cussing Mafia infiltration of legitimate business).
198. See United States v. Williams-Davis, Crim. No. 91-0559 (GHR), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19465 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1991) (prosecuting racketeering charges of murder, money
laundering, and various narcotics offenses; the murders were committed to retaliate against
rival drug gangs or to eliminate persons who threatened the organization, and the laundered
money was obtained through the narcotics sales), modified, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1176
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1992); United States v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1520, 1521 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(discussing murders and attempted murders of rival gang members committed by the El Rukn
gang in furtherance of their organization); see also Toups, supra note 192, at AI (quoting
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia Jay Stephens as stating that RICO pro-
vided an effective means by which to prosecute the violent crimes committed by drug gangs in
furtherance of their enterprise).
199. 65 Linked to Chicago Gang Indicted, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1989, at All.
200. For example, the El Rukns were recruited by the Libyan government to commit ter-
rorist acts within the United States. Gaddafi's Goons; A Chicago Gang's Terrorist Plot, TIME,
Dec. 7, 1987, at 27.
201. Id.
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B. Recent RICO Prosecutions of Sophisticated Urban Street Gangs
In a number of cities known for the prevalence of sophisticated urban
street gangs, the government has begun to use RICO as a tool to prosecute
gang members for their criminal activity.2"2 Two particular cases, one in-
volving a New York City gang called the "Westies" 2 °3 and another involv-
ing a Chicago gang called the "El Rukns,"2°' provide examples of successful
RICO prosecutions of sophisticated urban street gangs. Both gangs came
into existence in the early 1960s as fraternal neighborhood groups and have
since evolved to the level of highly organized criminal entities.2°5
In United States v. Coonan,2° the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit noted that the Westies controlled organized criminal activity
in the Hell's Kitchen area of Manhattan from the early 1960s until the late
1980s. 2°7 The gang was involved in loansharking, narcotics trafficking and
sales, and extortion, often working in concert with the Gambino crime fam-
ily to accomplish their criminal ends. 20 ' The gang's hallmark was ruthless
violence. 2' At their 1987 trial, all indicted gang members were convicted of
RICO violations. 210 On appeal, the Second Circuit examined the RICO
statutory language to determine what evidence would be sufficient to prove
the "enterprise" element and also considered the constitutionality of RICO
as it applied to the context of a gang. 211 In addressing the claim that suffi-
cient evidence had not been presented at trial to prove an "enterprise," the
202. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 792 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Ill. 1992); United States v.
Williams-Davis, Crim. No. 91-0559 (GHR), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1176 (D.D.C. Jan. 13,
1992); United States v. Coonan, 750 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Andrews,
749 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Since the convictions of many members of the El Rukin
gang, three motions for new trials were granted in light of prosecutorial misconduct during the
trial. United States v. Burnside, 824 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1993). The charges arose from
several instances where gang members testifying for the government were given illegal drugs
and other special benefits while imprisoned. Id. at 1233-48. While these instances of
prosecutorial misconduct by a United States Attorney are disturbing and inexcusable, they do
not affect the convictions in terms of the RICO analysis presented in this Comment.
203. Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1556.
204. See Andrews, 749 F. Supp. at 1521; United States v. Marcy, 777 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D.
11. 1991); United States v. Bingham, 769 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Boyd, 792 F.
Supp. at 1087.
205. See Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1556; Bingham, 769 F. Supp. at 1040 n.2.
206. 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991).
207. Id. at 1556.
208. Id.
209. See id. The gang was known for murdering then dismembering its rivals and enemies.
Id.
210. Id. at 1555.
211. Id. at 1559-62.
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court relied upon the gang's activities and its recognized position in under-
world criminal circles as proof of the existence of a criminal "enterprise.
212
The appeals court found RICO to be constitutional as it applied to the
criminal activities of gangs.213 Using reasoning very similar to that of the
First Circuit in United States v. Angiulo,2" 4 the Second Circuit found that
the "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity" portions of RICO
were not unconstitutionally vague when used in the context of a sophisti-
cated street gang.215 To the contrary, the court held, as in Angiulo, that the
Westies were precisely the kind of organization that RICO targeted and that
this fact should be obvious to a person of ordinary intelligence.21 6 The court
thereby equated a sophisticated urban street gang with an organized crimi-
nal entity, such as the Mafia, and deemed the gang to be worthy of prosecu-
tion under RICO.
2 17
The El Rukns gang, also founded in the early 1960s, provides another
comprehensive example of the sophisticated urban street gang. In United
States v. Andrews,218 the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois stated that the gang's primary business was the distribution of
narcotics, 2 9 which earned the gang a daily "take" of anywhere from
$50,000 to $70,000.220 Members of the El Rukns organization systemati-
cally killed rival drug dealers and members of rival gangs, and killed or in-
timidated witnesses to their crimes.22' The gang committed these crimes for
the sole purpose of maintaining power and a monopoly over their portion of
the Chicago drug trade.22 2
At trial, all indicted members of the gang were convicted of RICO viola-
tions. 223 In pre-trial motions the district court found that the indictment
properly alleged both the "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity"
212. Id. at 1560-61. "[R]egardless of internal disputes and membership changes, the Wes-
ties' power structure endured and its members functioned as a unit." Id.
213. Id. at 1562.
214. 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 149-58.
215. Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1560.
216. See id. at 1562; see also Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1179-80.
217. Coonan, 938 F. Supp. at 1560.
218. 749 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
219. Id. at 1521 (stating that the El Rukns main enterprise involved the trafficking of nar-
cotics through a complex and organized distribution network).
220. Ray Gibson & Maurice Possley, El Rukn Indictments are Fruit of 3-Year Federal
Investigation, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 1989, at C3.
221. Andrews, 749 F.2d at 1521.
222. Ray Gibson & John Gorman, Rukns, Robinson Indicted for Drugs, Murder, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 28, 1989, at Cl. United States Attorney Anton Valukas noted that "[i]n substance,
the indictments charge that for 24 years, these defendants sought to obtain and maintain con-
trol of drug territories through a systematic" use of violence. Id.
223. See United States v. Bingham, 769 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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elements under RICO.2 24 The court held that because the defendants were
alleged members of "The First Ward" of the El Rukn gang, whose purpose
was to facilitate illegal narcotics trafficking, the group constituted an "enter-
prise" for RICO purposes.225 The court also found that predicate acts that
occurred over a period of years, which might have amounted to several dif-
ferent conspiracies if not examined under RICO, did in fact qualify as a
RICO conspiracy.226
The Westies and the El Rukns gangs represent the type of street gang that
the government can and should prosecute using RICO. Both gangs provide
examples of highly sophisticated organized criminal entities that have hierar-
chical management structures and use violence and bribery to evade prose-
cution.227 Controversy exists, however, as to whether the design, intent, and
language of the RICO statute apply to this type of organization.
III. OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF RICO IN URBAN
STREET GANG PROSECUTIONS
The sophisticated urban street gang of the 1990s holds a place in society
that highly organized criminal organizations like the Mafia have tradition-
ally occupied. 22' As gangs have evolved from small, local organizations into
groups with national power affecting the nation's economic and political
structures, their threat has forced the government to change the way it views
urban street gangs for prosecution purposes. As a result, sophisticated ur-
ban street gangs have been characterized as organized criminal entities sus-
ceptible to prosecution under the RICO statute.229
Skeptics have criticized this hard-line analysis of urban street gangs be-
cause their members are often said to be young and impressionable and
street gangs are arguably less organized than La Cosa Nostra. 230 An objec-
tive analysis of sophisticated urban street gangs reveals, however, that such
gangs are nothing less than a more modern version of the Mafia. 231  The
224. United States v. Marcy, 777 F. Supp. 1393, 1395-98 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
225. Id. at 1395.
226. Id. at 1396.
227. See supra notes 169-92 and accompanying text (discussing the characteristics of a
sophisticated urban street gang).
228. See Skalitzky, supra note 179, at 348 (stating that urban street gangs and their drug
trafficking are becoming as problematic as the Mafia in its heyday); Dean Murphy, L.A. Black
Gangs Likened to Organized Crime Groups, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1987, at Al (reporting that
black gangs have emerged as predominate organized crime institutions in Los Angeles).
229. Skalitzky, supra note 179, at 349-50.
230. See, e.g., Burrell supra note 16, at 750-51 (discussing the often fraternal nature of
gangs); Jim Newton, U.S. Mounts Sweeping Crackdown on L.A. Gangs, L.A. TIMES, July 4,
1992, at AI (discussing the differences between La Cosa Nostra and urban street gangs such as
the Bloods and the Crips).
231. See infra notes 234-59 and accompanying text.
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sophisticated gangs are thus appropriate targets for RICO prosecutions, fit-
ting within both the design and intent of the RICO statute as clarified by the
organized crime framework,2 32 as well as the definition of critical RICO
provisions.233
A. Statutory Design and Intent: Fitting Urban Street Gangs into the
Organized Crime Framework
The goal of eradicating organized crime forms the basis for the design and
intent of the RICO statute.234 Thus, the statute is most effective when used
to prosecute highly organized and sophisticated criminal groups. Even the
fiercest opponents of the statute agree that if RICO is to be used in any sort
of prosecution, it should be limited to use against the Mafia and similar orga-
231nizations.  In addition, legislative history and statutory construction sug-
gest that Congress intended RICO to be elastic so as to continuously apply
to the evolving concept of organized crime in the United States.236 Because
of their structural, organizational, and functional similarities to the Mafia,
urban street gangs fit within the narrow group of entities that RICO is
designed to prosecute. Moreover, a brief analysis demonstrates that gangs
possess characteristics similar to those of the Mafia and satisfy the organized
crime framework of characteristics: continuity, structure, membership, crim-
inality, violence, and a power/profit goal.237
The continuity element requires that an organization operate with a crim-
inal purpose over an extended period of time.238 Although the scope of
criminal activity undertaken by gangs may differ from that of the Mafia,
both groups typically engage in criminal activity that becomes the livelihood
of the organization throughout its duration.239 Chicago's El Rukn gang ex-
emplifies this continuity as it has been operating in a criminal manner for
several decades, 24 even though its criminal objectives have become more
232. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
233. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 25-29.
234. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988) (Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose).
235. See Reed, supra note 6, at 720 (citing RICO's success in combatting organized crime
and questioning the breadth of the statute and not whether it should be used to prosecute
organized crime).
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988) (Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose); see
also id. (Liberal Construction of Provisions Clause).
237. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 25-29.
238. Id. at 26.
239. Compare supra notes 64-68 (describing the criminal activities of La Cosa Nostra) with
supra notes 174-92 (describing the criminal activities of urban street gangs).
240. Patricia King, A Snitch's Tale: The Killer Gang, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at 45; see
also supra notes 218-26 and accompanying text (discussing the El Rukn gang).
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sophisticated.24 1 Other gangs, with less impressive criminal histories, may
also meet the continuity requirement by simply carrying on illicit activities
over a period of time.
241
The structure element requires that the group have an established mana-
gerial structure.24 3 As with La Cosa Nostra, the structure and rank of gang
members are very complex and follow strict protocol. 244 Sophisticated ur-
ban street gangs involved in the drug trade fit this profile because they have a
management hierarchy that mimics the structure of a complex marketing
and sales organization.24 5
Furthermore, to fit the organized crime profile, the organization must re-
strict membership.246 Although the formal membership restrictions of a so-
phisticated urban street gang may not be as numerous as the Mafia's, the
rituals surrounding entry and participation in a street gang serve to effec-
tively restrict the gang's membership.2 47 Membership is often determined
along racial and ethnic lines,24 and like the Mafia, death is often the only
means of leaving a gang.
249
241. The El Rukn gang has been called "the ultimate street gang." Eric Harrison, 8-State
Raid Aims 'Death Blow' at Notorious Chicago Gang, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1989, at A2. The El
Rukns formed 28 years ago as a street gang and has since evolved into a "major organized-
crime empire" involved in narcotics trafficking, twenty murders, and seven attempted
murders. Ray Gibson & John Gorman, Rukns, Robinson Indicted for Drugs, Murder, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 28, 1989, at Al.
242. See United States v. Williams-Davis, Crim. No. 91-0559 (GHR), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19465 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1991) (discussing the operation of the "R Street organiza-
tion"), modified, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1176 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1992); Skalitzky, supra note
179, at 394-97 (discussing the Bloods and the Crips and their criminal activities in the context
of the continuing criminal enterprise charge).
243. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 26-27.
244. Compare supra notes 29-61 and accompanying text (discussing the structure of La
Cosa Nostra) with notes 169-92 and accompanying text (discussing the structure of urban
street gangs).
245. Skalitzky, supra note 179, at 360-62. "Inevitably, a gang's organization will mimic
the larger structure of society." Id. at 361.
246. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 27.
247. Sally A. Stewart, Gangs; 'It's Like Your Family'; Aspiring Breakdance Group Becomes
Drug-Dealing Crips, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1989, at A6 (describing "jump[ing] in" as a process
whereby a prospective member must fight three current gang members at one time, and if the
prospective member is still standing after ten minutes, he becomes a member of the gang); see
also Herbert Edelhertz, Introduction to MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 121, at 1, 28-36.
248. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 33-128 (discussing emerging
groups in organized crime, this Justice Department publication classified all emerging power-
ful gangs along ethnic lines as is the general practice in identifying this type of criminal
organization).
249. See, e.g., Jon D. Hull, No Way Out, TIME, Aug. 17, 1992, at 38 ("The quickest exit
from gang life is via the morgue .... 'You make a commitment, and it's lifelong.' ") (quoting
Daniel Swope, Executive Director of BUILD, a Chicago community group).
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Another element of the organized crime profile requires that the entity
rely on criminal activity to generate the income that finances the organiza-
tion.25° For the Mafia, this activity began as gambling and escalated to nar-
cotics trafficking. 251 Increased gang involvement in the drug trade satisfies
this requirement.252
Achieving goals through the use of violence is yet another element of the
organized crime profile.253 While the Mafia is known for its constant use of
violence to achieve its goals, gangs too systematically use violence.254 The
daily headlines of any major newspaper in this country illustrate that this is
true for urban street gangs. 255 The indictments of notorious gangs such as
the El Rukns or the Westies, containing multiple allegations of murder and
attempted murder, also aptly demonstrate this point.256
Finally, the organization must have a power/profit motive.257 The Mafia
obtained power and control through the proceeds from its illicit activities as
well as its infiltration of legitimate business.258 The power and profits de-
rived from narcotics trafficking allow the gangs readily to fulfill this ele-
ment.259 Based on the organized crime framework, sophisticated urban
street gangs are appropriate targets for RICO prosecutions. However, it is
also necessary to examine the language and application of pertinent RICO
provisions to ascertain whether they apply to urban street gangs as well.
250. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 28.
251. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (stating that organized crime derives large
profits from gambling and narcotics distribution).
252. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
253. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 28-29.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Daniel Golden, A Failure to Communicate; Police and the Minority Commu-
nity are Both Frustrated with Boston's Record Homicide Rate and Internally Divided Over How
to Deal with Gang Violence, BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Feb. 17, 1991, at 16 (discussing
police response to gang violence in Boston); Doug Haberman & William Douglas, Man Ar-
rested in Thanksgiving Killing, NEWSDAY, Dec. 3, 1989, at 25 (relating the story of a gang-
related killing of a fourteen year-old youth who refused to continue selling drugs for the gang);
Edmund Mahony, State Embraces Tough New Ally in Its War on Crime: The Feds, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 5, 1992, at Al (stating that federal agents will aid local officials in attempts to
combat gang violence); Recktenwald & Lenhart, supra note 164, at C1 (discussing the impact
of gang violence on the rapidly increasing homicide rate); Phil Sneiderman, Investigators Count
Year's 47 Homicides, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1992, at Jl (blaming the high homicide rate in one
section of Los Angeles on gang violence).
256. See generally United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1486 (1992); United States v. Williams-Davis, Crim. No. 91-0559 (GHR), 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19465 at *2 & n.l (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1991), modified, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1176
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1992); United States v. Boyd, 792 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
257. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 29.
258. See supra note 98.
259. See supra note 190.
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B. Applying the "Enterprise" and "Pattern of Racketeering Activities"
Elements to Gang Cases
Although prosecution varies based upon the structure and activity of indi-
vidual gangs and the application of DOJ guidelines and RICO intent, a suc-
cessful RICO prosecution requires proof of both an "enterprise" and a
"pattern of racketeering activity" over an extended period of time.2" A
general review of sophisticated urban street gangs reveals that such organi-
zations are structurally and behaviorally oriented in a manner that makes
proving these elements possible.26 1
The "enterprise" element requires that the members of a group be united
in a common business purpose.2 62 There must be a core group of members,
arranged in a hierarchical structure, who share a common business goal.2 63
The group may be either wholly legitimate or illegitimate, or a combination
of the two.2 6 4 Advanced urban street gangs are united in a common business
purpose, usually narcotics importation and distribution, 265 have a hierarchi-
cal management structure,2 66 and are involved in illegitimate activities.26 7
Nonetheless, once the government has established the "enterprise" element,
it must also demonstrate a "pattern of racketeering activity."
268
The "enterprise" element serves as the nexus that unifies the conduct of
the organization and establishes a "pattern of racketeering activity. "269 So
long as all of the alleged acts are committed under the direction of the "en-
terprise" and occur within the statutory time frame, the RICO "pattern"
element will be satisfied. 27' The analysis for determining whether a "pat-
tern" exists looks to establish the existence of a "relationship plus con-
tinuity:"'27' that is, there must be a relationship between the acts committed
260. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
(1981); United States v. Pugnitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009
(1991); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 206-27.
262. United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1392 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see supra notes
121-29 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 262.
264. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
265. The El Rukn and Westies gangs provide excellent examples of this fact. See supra
notes 208, 219-21, 250-52 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 259.
268. See supra note 260.
269. United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1392 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
270. Id.
271. United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct.
2009 (1991).
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and continuity in the commission of the acts. 72 In the context of gang-
related RICO prosecutions, once the "enterprise" has been established, the
"pattern" element is usually not difficult to prove. Because of the significant
number of offenses that are committed on a daily basis through the operation
of a drug enterprise, the prosecution can tie drug charges to other charges,
such as violent crimes, in order to establish the "pattern."
273
As demonstrated, sophisticated urban street gangs fall within the design
and intent contemplated by RICO, as evidenced by application of the organ-
ized crime framework as well as the "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" provisions of the RICO statute.274 Moreover, because of
numerous structural and operational similarities with the Mafia, the criminal
organization providing the impetus for the creation of RICO, it follows
that sophisticated urban street gangs readily lend themselves to RICO
prosecutions.
C. A Proper and Effective Means for Fighting Today's Crime
As the few available cases in this area demonstrate, RICO may be critical
in aiding federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel in controlling
increasing levels of gang-related violence and crime.275 Today, sophisticated
urban street gangs are having the same effect on the economic and the social
structure of the nation that La Cosa Nostra had at the time the Kefauver
Committee exposed its existance;2 76 the similarities are unmistakable. As
Congress created RICO with the intention of eradicating organized criminal
272. Id. The Supreme Court has held that multiple schemes are not necessary to prove
RICO's "pattern element," although they are highly probative. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989). Thus, multiple acts within a single scheme constitute a
"pattern" if, absent law enforcement intervention, these practices comprised part of the organi-
zation's normal course of business and would continue indefinitely over time. Id. at 241-43.
273. Generally, narcotics charges alone will not suffice to support a RICO prosecution
because of the DOJ policy of using other less complex federal statutes to prosecute narcotics
violations. See OCRS MANUAL, supra note 116, at 27-28 (explaining that a RICO charge
should not be added to a mail fraud indictment absent a specific and articulable reason for
doing so).
274. See United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1559-64 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ill
S. Ct. 1486 (1992).
275. See, e.g., supra note 256.
276. The urban gang violence in Los Angeles which has erupted from local turf wars be-
tween the city's hundreds of gangs is reminiscent of Mafia-related violence in Chicago several
decades ago. While gangs are making thousands of dollars each day in proceeds from illegal
narcotics sales, members are also investing in legitimate businesses such as fast food franchises
and commercial real estate ventures. Skalitzky, supra note 179, at 364; see Ray Gibson &
Maurice Possley, El Rukn Indictments are Fruit of 3-year Federal Investigation, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 29, 1989, at C3. Moreover, members of gangs have enough power and capital to bribe
public officials. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
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entities and their negative influence on the nation,277 many of today's sophis-
ticated urban street gangs fall within the range of organizations that Con-
gress intended to be prosecuted under the statute.278
Although criticism has been leveled against any proposed expansion of the
scope of RICO, 279 the statute itself, through its liberal interpretation clause,
contemplates the use of the statutory provisions to prosecute new and
emerging criminal organizations. 2 0  Prosecution is not automatic, but
rather depends upon individual gang characteristics, the DOJ guidelines,
and application of the statutory provisions. Where a criminal organization
falls within the design, intent, and language of the statute, the use of RICO
is a proper, effective, and necessary means to combat the evils perpetrated
through gang structure and activity.2"' Based on such factors, and in light
of RICO's successful use in Mafia cases, it would be a detriment to national
efforts combatting organized crime for courts to preclude the use of the
RICO statute to fight new forms of organized crime in the 1990s.
IV. CONCLUSION
Four decades ago, the Mafia was a feared and enigmatic organization ex-
erting a tremendous criminal influence on the structure and economy of the
nation. While there are surely aspects of the Mafia that remain paradoxical
to law enforcement today, efforts to investigate and understand the organiza-
tion's structure and operational style have proven successful. The enactment
of RICO in 1970, together with continued study and investigation, has been
instrumental in the government's mission of eradicating organized crime and
has proven to be a most effective means of dismantling organized criminal
entities such as the Mafia.
As the Mafia's role in organized crime has diminished, sophisticated ur-
ban street gangs have moved quickly to fill the void in the illegal market-
place. Such gangs are highly organized, violent, criminal entities that
terrorize the nation's urban communities and are now expanding into subur-
ban and rural America. The predicament that the nation faces today with
sophisticated urban street gangs mirrors the nation's concern with the Mafia
four decades ago. The key difference is that today, unlike in the early 1950s,
a proven means of dealing with these organizations already exists-the
277. See supra notes 75-103 and accompanying text.
278. See United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding prosecution of
Westies street gang under RICO both proper and constitutional), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1486
(1992); supra notes 169-92 and accompanying text.
279. See Lynch III & IV, supra note 4, at 971-77; Reed, supra note 6, at 696; see also supra
note 16.
280. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988) (Liberal Construction of Provisions Clause).
281. See supra notes 206-27 and accompanying text.
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Based on the design,
intent, and language of the statute, coupled with the established organized
crime framework and the similarities between Mafia and gang organizations,
RICO is not only a proper and effective means for prosecuting sophisticated
urban street gangs but is also a necessity in order to work toward the goal of
eradicating organized crime in the United States.
Lesley Suzanne Bonney

